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Is It Prudent to Be Responsible? The Legal Rules
for Charities That Engage in Socially Responsible
Investing and Mission Investing
Susan N. Gary
ABSTRACT
Fiduciaries who invest assets held by a charity must act as prudent investors. This
Article examines the legal rules that apply to these fiduciaries, examining the duty of
loyalty and the duty of prudent administration for trustees of charitable trusts and
directors of nonprofit corporations. The Article focuses on the duty to act as a prudent
investor and the question of whether a charitable fiduciary can consider the charity’s
mission or purpose when making investment decisions. Recent developments in the laws
that regulate investing by fiduciaries provide guidance, and the Article concludes that
these rules permit consideration of a charity’s mission as one of many factors a prudent
investor considers. The Article briefly examines the history of socially responsible
investing, reviews the development of mission investing, and discusses three types of
socially responsible investing: screens, proxy voting, and community investing. Recent
data show improvements in the returns of screened funds and increased interest by
charities in mission investing. Fiduciaries must exercise care and judgment in making
investment decisions, but mission investing can meet the legal standards that apply to
fiduciaries as long as the fiduciaries act with prudence.
INTRODUCTION: CHARITIES AND INVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING
¶1

Socially responsible investing by charities gained notoriety in the 1970s and 1980s,
when colleges and universities faced pressure to divest holdings in South Africa to make
an anti-apartheid statement.1 At that time, critics raised concerns about whether a



Orlando J. and Marian H. Hollis Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. B.A. 1977 Yale
University; J.D. 1981 Columbia Law School. This Article benefited from comments received at Socially
Responsible Investing: Prudent or “Im”? the Annual Conference of the National Center on Philanthropy
and the Law at New York University School of Law in May 2008. The author would like to thank, in
particular, Harvey P. Dale, Joel C. Dobris; Harvey J. Goldschmidt; John H. Langbein; and John G. Simon.
In addition, the author would like to thank Grady Goodall for valuable research assistance and thoughtful
discussion of the issues in this Article.
1
Joel C. Dobris, Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of “South African” Securities, 65 NEB. L.
REV. 209 (1986); see John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79
MICH. L. REV. 72, 72 (1980). Socially responsible investing, or ethical investing, can trace its roots to the
anti-slavery efforts of Quakers in the 18th century. Benjamin J. Richardson, Putting Ethics into
Environmental Law: Fiduciary Duties for Ethical Investment, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243, 245 (2008),
available at
http://ohlj.ca/english/documents/OHLJ462_Richardson_PuttingEthicsintoEnvironmentalLaw.pdf.
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university or other fiduciary could legally engage in socially responsible investing. 2
Discussions at Yale University led to the development of criteria for the exercise of
investment responsibility by a university, with a focus on self-regulation to avoid
participation in social injury through investments.3 Since the 1970s, investment
companies have developed socially responsible funds for private investors. 4 Charities
continue to ponder what factors to consider in making investment decisions and whether
socially responsible investing should play a role.
Statutory laws on prudent investing—the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) 5
and the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) 6—provide
guidance on investment decision-making by charities, supplementing common law.
UPIA applies to charities organized as trusts, and UPMIFA applies primarily to charities
organized as nonprofit corporations. 7 The rules in the two uniform Acts on investment
decision-making are almost identical because UPMIFA drew its language from UPIA. 8
This Article will identify several types of investment decision-making that bring
into consideration factors beyond the typical risk and return analysis that investors use to
make decisions. This Article will analyze the law that applies to investment decisionmaking by charities, and conclude that consideration of the charity‘s mission as a factor
is both appropriate and legal. The Article does not suggest that investing for mission
should undercut the prudent investor rule. Rather, the Article explains that fiduciaries
managing a charity must make investment decisions that consider the factors that a
prudent investor should consider and argues that the charity‘s mission may be an
appropriate factor to consider as part of that process.

2

See Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 76.
See JOHN G. SIMON, CHARLES W. POWERS & JON P. GUNNEMANN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR/ UNIVERSITIES
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY vii (1972), available at http://acir.yale.edu/pdf/EthicalInvestor.pdf.
During 1968 and 1969, administrators, trustees, faculty, and students at Yale engaged in a series of
meetings to discuss whether universities should consider ―the social consequences of corporate activities
from which these institutions derive an endowment return.‖ Id. As an outgrowth of those discussions, in
the 1969–70 academic year, an interdisciplinary seminar considered questions related to socially
responsible investing. Id. The professors who led the seminar produced a book, informed by the
discussions in the seminar, which outlined criteria for the exercise of investment responsibility by a
university. Id. at ix. The criteria are narrow and focus on self-regulation by universities ―to avoid
participation in social injury‖ through investments. Id. at 14.
4
See, e.g., CALVERT INVESTMENTS, http://www.calvert.com; DOMINI SOC. INVESTMENTS,
http://www.domini.com; PAX World Mutual Funds, PAX WORLD INVESTMENTS,
http://www.paxworld.com/funds/pax-world-mutual-funds.
5
UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT (1994).
6
UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (2006).
7
UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT prefatory note; UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT
§ 2(4)(5). UPMIFA applies to entities of all sorts that hold funds exclusively for charitable purposes but
excludes trusts unless a charity is the trustee of the trust. Id.
8
See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3 cmt. UPMIFA does not incorporate a duty
of loyalty directly and refers to other law–either trust law or nonprofit corporation law–for that rule. Id. at
§ 3(b).
3

107

NORT HW EST ERN JO URN AL O F L AW AND SOCI AL PO L ICY

[2011

I. INVESTING TO SERVE A CHARITABLE PURPOSE9
¶4

This Article uses three terms to describe three different types of investment assets
or investment strategies: program-related assets, socially responsible investing, and
mission investing. The Article draws a distinction between the terms ―socially
responsible investing‖ and ―mission investing‖ that may not be widely used. 10 The
Article employs this distinction to clarify issues faced by charitable fiduciaries when the
fiduciaries make investment decisions. Beyond this Article, however, the term ―socially
responsible investing,‖ or ―SRI,‖ is commonly used to encompass the type of investing
the Article terms ―mission investing.‖ 11
A. Program-Related Assets

¶5

¶6

A charity may hold program-related assets to carry out its programs. A university
needs classrooms, science laboratories, and dormitories. A soup kitchen may own a
building with a kitchen, dining room, food storage room, and office space. An animal
shelter will need a building and some amount of land to house and exercise the animals.
All of these assets have some financial value, but the charities hold the assets for their
functional value. A piece of land or a building may increase in value, and in rare cases,
could be a source of financial gain for the charity, but a charity will not make a decision
to purchase an asset of this sort with investment return as the primary consideration. The
possibility of investment return may be a factor in deciding which building to buy, but the
primary consideration will be the building‘s usefulness as a place to conduct charitable
activities. 12
UPMIFA defines a program-related asset as ―an asset held by an institution
primarily to accomplish a charitable purpose of the institution and not primarily for
investment.‖13 UPMIFA excludes program-related assets from its requirement that a
charity invest funds prudently. 14 As the comments to UPMIFA point out, however, even
9

This Article uses the term ―charitable‖ in its traditional, trust law sense and therefore includes purposes
such as educational purposes. The Uniform Trust Code defines ―charitable purpose‖ as ―the relief of
poverty, the advancement of education or religion, the promotion of health, governmental or municipal
purposes, or other purposes the achievement of which is beneficial to the community.‖ UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 405(a) (2005). UPMIFA adopts the same definition. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS
ACT § 2(1). As the comment to this subsection in UPMIFA explains, the ―standard derives from the
English Statute of Charitable Uses, enacted in 1601.‖ Id. at § 2(1) cmt. This Article uses the term
―charity‖ to refer to an organization created for charitable purposes, whether organized as a charitable trust
or as a nonprofit corporation.
10
See SARAH COOCH & MARK KRAMER, COMPOUNDING IMPACT: MISSION INVESTING BY U.S.
FOUNDATIONS 10 (2007) (discussing terminology and the inconsistency that exists in the way the terms are
used). The Cooch and Kramer study uses the term ―mission investing‖ in the way this Article uses the
term. The study notes that ―mission-related investing‖ is also used but sometimes is limited to market-rate
investments or investments made by endowments. Id.
11
See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, SRI—Shibboleth or Canard (Socially Responsible Investing, That Is), 42 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 755, 757 (2008) (noting among five reasons that people engage in SRI are that
people want investments to ―match the mission‖).
12
UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2(7).
13
Id.
14
Id. § 2(5). The Drafting Committee considered making UPMIFA applicable to all assets held by a
charity, and if the Act had applied to all assets held by a charity, the usefulness of a program-related asset
would have been a factor to consider in determining the prudence of the investment. See Memorandum
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assets used ―primarily‖ for a charitable purpose may also serve an investment purpose. 15
Although UPMIFA does not apply to those assets, the duty of prudence that applies to all
decision-making by a charity‘s fiduciaries requires the charity to examine the investment
component of the asset and use that information to inform decision-making with respect
to that asset.16 The charity should consider the cost of the asset, as well as the possibility
of an investment return in the future.17
UPIA does not exclude program-related investments and therefore impliedly
includes them, so any asset held by a charitable trust will be subject to the investment
standard of UPIA. UPIA directs the trustee to consider the purposes of the trust 18 and
also directs the trustee to consider the special value of an asset to the trust‘s purposes, 19
so a trustee of a charitable trust can invest in a program-related asset within the
constraints of UPIA. However, the trustee should consider the economic factors of the
investment, just as directors of a nonprofit corporation making a decision about a
program-related asset consider those factors under the general duty of care and
prudence. 20
The Internal Revenue Code uses the term ―program-related investment‖ to exclude
certain assets from § 4944, the provision that imposes a penalty on a private foundation
that invests in an asset that would ―jeopardize the carrying out of its exempt purposes.‖21
Section 4944 defines a program-related investment as one ―the primary purpose of which
is to accomplish one or more of the [charity‘s exempt purposes] . . . and no significant
purpose of which is the production of income or the appreciation of property.‖22 The
§ 4944 definition is somewhat different from the UPMIFA definition, 23 but the difference
is not relevant for purposes of this Article. Both definitions apply to assets a charity
owns primarily for program purposes and not to assets owned primarily for investment
purposes. This Article focuses on assets which serve primarily as financial investments
but which also serve some program purposes.

from Susan Gary, Reporter, UMIFA Drafting Comm. to UMIFA Drafting Comm. (Oct. 20, 2003),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/umoifa/memo1003.htm [hereinafter UMIFA
Drafting Comm. Memo]. The appeal of having the prudent investor rules of UPMIFA apply to all assets
would have been that some assets have mixed purposes, both investment and program. See id. After
consideration, the Drafting Committee decided that treating assets that serve only incidental investment
purposes as ―investments‖ did not make sense. See id. The university classrooms, the dining room for the
soup kitchen, and the kennels for the animal shelter do not serve investment purposes in the usual sense,
and seemed out of place in a statute that provides rules on prudent investment. See id.
15
UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2(7) cmt. (noting that a program providing loans
to inner-city businesses may serve both a charitable and an investment purpose).
16
See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1988).
17
See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2(7) cmt.
18
UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (1994).
19
Id. § 2(c)(8).
20
REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30.
21
I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2006). See infra text accompanying notes 166–74.
22
§ 4944(c).
23
The UPMIFA drafting committee changed ―significant purpose‖ to ―primarily for investment‖ in an
attempt to make it more difficult for a charity to disguise a failed investment as a program-related
investment. See UMIFA Drafting Comm. Memo, supra note 14.
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B. Socially Responsible Investing
¶9

In general, the idea behind socially responsible investing is that investment
decision makers should consider social or ethical issues as well as financial ones in
making decisions about investments.24 Advocates argue that investments can, and
should, effect positive social change as well as generate financial returns.25 Socially
responsible investing, also called social investing, gained adherents in the 1970s. 26 At
that time, pension funds and universities, in particular, faced growing pressure to engage
in socially responsible investing. 27 In particular, concerns over apartheid in South Africa
led to calls for universities to divest from companies that engaged in business there; 28
pension funds of state employees were pushed to invest in businesses located in the
state;29 and union pension plans began to invest in ―socially desirable projects.‖30 The
concept also gained critics who raised concerns about whether socially responsible
investing by fiduciaries violated the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 31
¶10
Socially responsible investing has developed in breadth and depth since the
1970s.32 Socially responsible funds created in the 1970s and 1980s either screened out
24

Maria O‘Brien Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an
Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1, nn.2–3 (1993) (citing several attempts at defining socially
responsible investing). In their 1980 critique of socially responsible investing, John Langbein and Richard
Posner defined the term to mean ―excluding the securities of certain otherwise attractive companies from an
investor‘s portfolio because the companies are judged to be socially irresponsible, and including the
securities of certain otherwise unattractive companies because they are judged to be behaving in a socially
laudable way.‖ Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 73. They explained that they used ―attractive‖ and
―unattractive‖ to ―refer to the conventional objective of investment, which is to make money.‖ Id. In
contrast, a recent study explains that ―[s]ocially responsible investing (SRI) is an investment process that
considers the social and environmental consequences of investments, both positive and negative, within the
context of rigorous financial analysis.‖ SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, 2005 REPORT ON SOCIALLY
RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2006), available at
http://www.socialinvest.org/pdf/research/Trends/2005%20Trends%20Report.pdf [hereinafter TRENDS].
25
Maria Markham Thompson, Socially Responsible Investing Has Become a Mainstream Practice, 50
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. B24 (2004), available at http://chronicle.com/article/Socially-ResponsibleInvesting/36437/.
26
Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 72 (citing EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SHOULD
PENSION ASSETS BE MANAGED FOR SOCIAL/POLITICAL PURPOSES? (Dallas L. Salisbury ed. 1980))
(considering social investing by pension funds and university endowment funds); ANNE SIMPSON, THE
GREENING OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT: HOW THE ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND POLITICS ARE RESHAPING
STRATEGIES 27 (1991) (summarizing the history of ethical investment in the U.S. dating back to 1928 when
religious organizations began to engage in social investing).
27
See Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 72–73.
28
Hylton, supra note 24, at 3 (describing South African apartheid as the issue that attracted the attention of
―virtually every socially responsible fund‖).
29
See Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 72.
30
See, e.g., id. at 72 (describing a United Auto Workers‘ labor contract that applied a social investing
requirement to ―up to ten percent of new pension contributions‖).
31
See id. at 96 (arguing ―that social investing is contrary to trust law‖).
32
See TRENDS, supra note 24, at 1–2 (tracking growth in socially responsible investments from $40 billion
in 1984 to $2.29 trillion in 2005); Lewis D. Solomon & Karen C. Coe, Social Investments by Nonprofit
Corporations and Charitable Trusts: A Legal and Business Primer for Foundation Managers and Other
Nonprofit Fiduciaries, 66 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 213, 213 (1997); Thompson, supra note 25; see also, Cooch &
Kramer, supra note 10, at 14–26 (providing data on trends in mission investing); SOCIAL INVESTMENT
FORUM, 2007 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii
(2007), available at http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/pubs/ (follow ―2007 Report on Socially
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companies with poor social or environmental records33 or focused on a particular issue,
like apartheid.34 In recent years, funds have continued to develop exclusionary screens,35
and in addition, funds now employ inclusionary screens that look for companies with
good corporate performance on a variety of social and environmental issues. 36 Socially
responsible investors may also evaluate corporate governance and use shareholder
advocacy and community investment as strategies. 37
¶11
Diversification has become easier because socially responsible funds are now
available across a broad range of share classes and in different investment styles. 38
Socially responsible investing now provides a variety of choices, and allows investors to
focus on issues of particular concern to them. For charities, the development of choices,
both in terms of investment options and in terms of types of issues addressed by the
funds, has meant that a charity can more easily make carrying out its mission a factor in
making decisions about investments.
C. Mission Investing
¶12

―Mission investing,‖ as this Article uses the term, means something different from
socially responsible investing. Mission investing means that a charity uses some of its
investment assets, as distinguished from its program-related assets, in ways that
accomplish its investment objectives while also supporting its charitable mission. 39 The
charity considers its mission as a factor in making investment decisions, and does not
Responsible Investing Trends in the United States Executive Summary‖ hyperlink; then fill out request
form; then document will be emailed to you) [hereinafter TRENDS (2007)] (―From 2005–2007 alone SRI
assets increased more than 18 percent while the broader universe of professionally managed assets
increased less than 3 percent.‖). The Responsible Endowments Coalition, created in 2004, has brought
together students, alumni, and faculty from thirty-five universities and colleges. RESPONSIBLE
ENDOWMENTS COALITION, http://www.endowmentethics.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2010) (―Responsible
investment . . . can support environmental progress and social justice all while making great financial
returns.‖). In 2008, Cambridge Associates, an investment consulting firm for foundations and
endowments, announced its launch of a mission investing division. See MARK KRAMER & ANNE STETSON,
A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE LAW OF MISSION INVESTING FOR U.S. FOUNDATIONS 5 (2008). Three foundations,
the Heron Foundation, Meyer Memorial Trust, and the Annie E. Casey Foundation, supported the
development of this division. Id.
33
TRENDS, supra note 24, at 4.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 7–8, Figure 2.5 (identifying the five most common social screens: tobacco, alcohol, gambling,
defense/weapons, community relations). See Perry S. Bechky, Darfur, Divestment, and Dialog, 30 U. PA.
J. INT‘L L. 823 (2009), for an interesting discussion of recent divestment efforts focused on Sudan,
including a description of the work of the Sudan Divestment Task Force.
36
See TRENDS, supra note 24, at 3 (―Generally, social investors seek to own profitable companies that
make positive contributions to society.‖). The Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation lists inclusionary screens
that direct managers to identify companies with an environmental commitment and a commitment to
reduce adverse environmental impacts, companies that support sustainable agriculture, companies that
facilitate pay equity, and companies whose labor practices and compensation standards support collective
bargaining, living wage, and pay equity. Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation Investment Policy, JESSIE SMITH
NOYES FOUNDATION, http://www.noyes.org/taxonomy/term/10 [hereinafter Noyes Investment Policy].
37
See TRENDS, supra note 24, at 16–27.
38
See id. at 7 (reporting at least 201 screened funds and more than 370 share classes). The 2007 survey
reported 260 screened funds. TRENDS (2007), supra note 32, at ii.
39
Dobris, supra note 11, at 768 (describing mission investing as ―making fuzzy the formerly clear
boundary between investing for gain and granting for charitable purposes‖).
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ignore the other factors a prudent investor should consider. Mission investing assumes
that when an investment decision maker considers the best interests of a charity, the
decision maker can use the charity‘s mission as a factor, while also analyzing the
potential financial gain from an investment. The investment may either yield an
investment return similar to investments made without consideration of mission, or the
mission-related benefits may outweigh any reduced financial benefits. If the charity
decides to accept somewhat lower financial returns in order to obtain mission-related
benefits, then the investment may be considered an expenditure decision as well as an
investment decision. 40
II. LEGAL RULES APPLICABLE TO INVESTING BY CHARITIES
A. Fiduciary Duties
¶13

Trust law has developed strict fiduciary rules to protect the interests of beneficiaries
who have beneficial but not legal title to the property held in trust. 41 A fiduciary holds
legal but not beneficial title to assets and may be tempted to try to benefit personally from
the position of legal control. 42 Fiduciary duties also apply in corporate law, where
shareholders own beneficial interests and the directors manage the business. For
charities, the fiduciary duties carry particular importance because the ―beneficiary‖ may
be a charitable purpose or an indefinite number of unidentified beneficiaries and not an
identifiable person. 43 Oversight of charitable management is limited, 44 so the legal rules
are of particular importance. Whether a charity is organized as a charitable trust or as a
nonprofit corporation, the rules provide guidance to persons managing charities.

40

A determination of the financial ―cost‖ of a mission investment will be difficult. Empirical work
examining the period 1992–2007 found that investments in companies that scored high on social
responsibility factors such as community, employee relations and the environment had a performance
advantage related to investments based on conventional investment strategies. See MEIR STATMAN &
DENYS GLUSHKOV, THE WAGES OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM 21 (2008),
available at http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/research/documents/2008WinningPrize-Moskowitz.pdf.
Investments in companies associated with tobacco, alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, or nuclear
operations, left investors at a return disadvantage. Id.
41
See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 640–43 (1995)
(―The trust relationship of necessity puts the beneficiaries of a trust at the peril of the trustees‘ misbehavior
—for example, if the trustees should misappropriate or mismanage the trust‘s assets. The central concern
of modern trust law is to safeguard against those dangers.‖).
42
See also GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 342 (6th ed. 1987). In a discussion of the duty of loyalty, Bogert‘s
treatise on Trusts says: ―It is a well-known quality of human nature that it is extremely difficult, or perhaps
impossible, for an individual to act fairly in the interests of others whom he represents and at the same time
to consider his own financial advantage.‖ Id. at 342.
43
This Article discusses investments by fiduciaries of charities and not other fiduciaries, for example those
managing pensions. The analysis of socially responsible investing by pension managers must address the
fact that a pension plan has identifiable beneficiaries. A charity does not, which means consideration of the
interests of the beneficiaries can, and should, consider mission rather than individual people.
44
Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law and Tax Law, 21 U.
HAW. L. REV. 593, 609 (2000).
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B. Duty of Loyalty
1. Meaning of the Duty of Loyalty

¶14

The duty of loyalty applies to the trustees and directors who manage a charity. In
trust law, the duty of loyalty is the trustee‘s duty to act ―solely in the interests of the
beneficiaries.‖45 The trustee must put the trustee‘s duties to the trust first and cannot act
for personal benefit. If a trustee interacts with the trust on the trustee‘s own account, for
the trustee‘s personal interests, such self-dealing can constitute a breach of the duty of
loyalty. 46 Under trust law, a beneficiary can void a self-dealing transaction unless the
trust document authorized the transaction; a court approved the transaction; the statute of
limitations has run; the beneficiary consented to or ratified the transaction; the
beneficiary released the trustee; or the trustee entered into the transaction before
becoming the trustee.47
¶15
Nonprofit corporation statutes apply the duty of loyalty to charities organized as
nonprofit corporations. A nonprofit director must act ―in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.‖48 A conflict of interest
transaction is voidable unless the transaction was fair at the time it was entered into; was
approved by the board of directors acting in good faith and with a reasonable belief that
the transaction was fair to the charity, after disclosure to the board of the material facts
and the interest of the conflicted director; or was approved by the attorney general or a
court.49
¶16
In both trust law and nonprofit corporation law, the duty of loyalty is structured to
prevent a fiduciary from taking advantage of the trust for personal gain. Thus, the focus
of the duty of loyalty under both trust and nonprofit corporate law has been on selfdealing by the trustee.
2. Application to Investment Decision-Making
¶17

Clearly, a fiduciary should not make an investment decision for the charity based
on private benefit to the fiduciary. 50 Even if the fiduciary does not benefit personally,
however, a comment to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains that the duty of loyalty
treats as improper a trustee‘s decision to invest in a manner that benefits a third party or a
non-trust objective.51 The beneficiaries‘ interests must come first, but then the question
45

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (2005); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (2007) (―[A] trustee
has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.‖). John Langbein has argued
that a ―best interests‖ standard would better serve trust beneficiaries. John H. Langbein, Questioning the
Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest? 114 YALE L. J. 929, 980–86 (2005). The duty of
loyalty developed in the common law of trusts, long before the Uniform Trust Code codified the duty. See
BOGERT, supra note 42, at § 95, 341–47.
46
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(b).
47
Id. § 802(b)(1)–(5). A self-dealing transaction is not automatically void but instead is voidable by a
beneficiary. Even if no exception is met, a beneficiary can choose not to void a self–dealing transaction.
Id.
48
REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1988).
49
Id. § 8.31(a)–(b).
50
Beneficiaries can consent to transactions that would otherwise be self-dealing, but the transaction must
be in the sole or best interests of the beneficiaries. See supra text accompanying notes 45–47.
51
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. f (2007).
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becomes how one views the ―sole interests‖ or ―best interests‖ of the beneficiaries.
Traditionally, the view has been that the trustee‘s duty relates only to the beneficiaries‘
financial interests.52 Yet nothing in the duty of loyalty requires the trustee to exclude
consideration of a beneficiary‘s non-financial interests.
¶18
The view of what constitutes the sole interests or best interests appears to be
changing. 53 With respect to private investors, commentators have questioned whether the
investors‘ sole interests lie in maximizing returns without regard to the types of
investments the trust makes. 54 Meir Statman, a professor of finance at Santa Clara
University who studies investor behavior, comments that investment advice that ignores
beneficiaries‘ non-monetary interests is ―fundamentally flawed.‖55 He notes that
financial advisors regularly tell investors with concerns about environmental degradation
to invest in companies that pollute and then use the investment returns to fund charities
that fight pollution.56 Statman views this kind of advice as irrational. Statman discusses
private investors, but his analysis of the interests of private individuals is instructive with
respect to the interests of trust beneficiaries. At issue for a trustee is determining the
interests of the beneficiaries, and Statman suggests that if one asks private individuals
about preferences for investing assets, their interests may well include non-monetary
interests.57
¶19
Turning to charities, determining the sole interests or best interests of a charitable
purpose or even specific charitable entities becomes more complicated than considering
the interests of private beneficiaries. A charity wants to maximize income within its risk
tolerance and use the income for its charitable purposes. The charity may also want to
use its investments to support its charitable mission. How does the duty of loyalty apply
to mission investing or socially responsible investing by charities?
¶20
A fiduciary‘s own views of socially responsible investing may conflict with the
charitable purposes of the charity. If a fiduciary decides to invest in a particular asset
because doing so will be ―best for the world‖ in some general way, or because the
investment will support a cause the fiduciary favors, then making the investment decision
on those grounds could be a breach of the duty of loyalty. If the investment does well
52

Many scholars writing about the duty of loyalty have assumed that a beneficiary‘s interests in a trust are
only financial interests. See, e.g., Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 96 (―[A] trustee who sacrifices the
beneficiary‘s financial well-being for any other object breaches both his duty of loyalty to the beneficiary
and his duty of prudence in investment.‖).
53
Joel Dobris has recently stated that the duty of loyalty may encompass non-monetary interests. He
writes, with respect to private trusts:
If a fiduciary invests in SRI at a cost in risk or return to please himself, that is a breach of
the duty of loyalty. If he does it to please some of the beneficiaries and there is a
financial cost, he‘s breaching his duty of impartiality (to the non-SRI beneficiaries) and
his duty to invest competently. If truly all of the beneficiaries want SRI investing, they
can set aside any relevant duties, or it could be claimed they were in the receipt of
psychic income.
Dobris, supra note 11, at n. 27.
54
See id.
55
See Meir Statman, Why You’re Not a Rational Investor, FORTUNE MAG., Nov. 7, 2007, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/11/12/101008311/index.htm.
56
See id.
57
Id. (quoting an investor as saying ―I consider it a luxury that I now have the ability to invest more in line
with my values‖).
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financially, no one is likely to complain, but even so, a fiduciary who invests for reasons
unrelated to the charity has not acted in the sole interests of the charity.
¶21
If, instead, the fiduciary uses the interests of the charity to inform investment
decision-making, doing so may be within the scope of the duty of loyalty. The fiduciary
must act for the sole interests or best interests of the charity, and those interests may
include non-monetary interests. Thus, mission investing is consistent with the duty of
loyalty. Although no court has adopted this analysis, revisions to comments to the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts suggest that the law, or at least legal thinking, is headed
toward this understanding of how the duty of loyalty applies to investing by charities. 58
¶22
In a critique of 1970s social investing, Professors Langbein and Posner pointed out
that a trustee owes a duty of loyalty to the trust beneficiaries to carry out the purposes of
the trust.59 The broad approach to social investing taken at the time—the idea of
investing in socially desirable projects that have general social utility but no particular
connection to the mission of the trust—meant that trustees who engaged in social
investing were not concerned solely with the interests of the beneficiaries. 60 Langbein
and Posner concluded that the duty of loyalty forbids social investing ―in its current
form.‖61 They explained that the social principles embodied in the idea of social
investing were ―poorly specified‖ 62 and that the criteria used to identify ―socially
irresponsible companies‖ were ―dubious.‖ 63 At that time, issues involved in deciding
which investments were socially responsible may have been unrelated to the purpose of
the charity. 64 Langbein and Posner noted that social investing could confer a noneconomic value on the trust beneficiary that might compensate for any loss of economic
value in the investment.65 Given the type of social investing engaged in at the time,
however, Langbein and Posner concluded that the non-economic value did not directly
benefit the beneficiaries of the trust.66
¶23
Concurring with these arguments against social investing, the comment to the
UPIA‘s section on the duty of loyalty includes a strongly worded statement against
socially responsible investing:
No form of so-called ‗social investing‘ is consistent with the duty of
loyalty if the investment activity entails sacrificing the interests of trust
beneficiaries—for example, by accepting below-market returns—in favor

58

See discussion infra Part C. The duty of loyalty provision in the 1992 version of Restatement (Third) of
Trusts did not include a reference to social investing. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1992).
Neither did the prudent investor rule. Id. § 227.
59
Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 96–97 (explaining that a trustee breaches the duty of loyalty owed to
the trust if someone other than the beneficiary benefits at the expense of the beneficiary).
60
See id. at 96–97.
61
Id. at 110–11.
62
Id. at 83 (―[T]here is no consensus about which social principles to pursue and about which investments
are consistent or inconsistent with those principles.‖).
63
Id. at 84.
64
See SIMON, POWERS & GUNNEMANN, supra note 3, at 156–60 (identifying as a rationale for a university
to engage in socially responsible investing the need to ―foster a climate conducive to education.‖).
65
Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 94.
66
Id. at 95. Much of the Langbein and Posner article focuses on investing by trustees of private trusts and
pension funds and then applies its analysis to charitable trusts. Id. at 110–11.
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of the interests of the persons supposedly benefitted by pursuing the
particular social cause. 67
The comment does not discuss mission investing and ignores the argument that investing
for a social purpose could be consistent with the interests of beneficiaries. 68
¶24
In 2007, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts added language from the UPIA to the
Restatement‘s commentary on its section on the duty of loyalty. 69 The Restatement
comment notes that ―[n]ot surprisingly, considerable disagreement continues about what
loyalty should require in this context.‖70 The comment then cites articles addressing the
issue in the context of pension plans and does not discuss investing by charities. 71
Although this Restatement comment does not directly address investing by charities, it
does include a reference to the Restatement section on prudent investment.72 The
comment on prudent investment draws a distinction between socially responsible
investing and mission investing, although the comment does not use those terms in
making the distinction. 73
¶25
The Restatement‘s section on prudent investment includes the requirement that the
trustee must conform to the duty of loyalty. 74 The comment to that section explains that
the trustee cannot invest trust assets to promote the trustee‘s personal views on social or
political causes. 75 The comment notes that the terms of the trust may permit investing
based on social or political issues 76 and that beneficiaries may consent to such
investing. 77 Next, the comment turns to investing by charities:
[S]ocial considerations may be taken into account in investing the funds of
charitable trusts to the extent the charitable purposes would justify an
expenditure of trust funds for the social issue or cause in question or to the
67

UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 5 cmt. (1994). Professor Langbein served as Reporter for UPIA and as
Reporter wrote the comments.
68
See id. ―Commentators supporting social investing tend to concede the overriding force of the duty of
loyalty. They argue instead that particular schemes of social investing may not result in below-market
returns.‖ Id.
69
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. f (2007).
70
Id.
71
See id. The comment cites to two articles addressing the issue in the context of pension plans. Id.
Pension plans have identifiable beneficiaries and are beyond the scope of this Article.
72
Id.
73
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. c (2007). (―[S]ocial considerations may be taken into
account in investing the funds of charitable trusts to the extent the charitable purposes would justify an
expenditure of trust funds for the social issue or cause in question or to the extent the investment decision
can be justified on grounds of advancing, financially or operationally, a charitable activity conducted by the
trust.‖).
74
Id. § 90(c)(1).
75
Id. § 90 cmt. c.
76
Id. A trust agreement can always permit a trustee to invest in a way that would otherwise constitute selfdealing. For example, a settlor anticipating the importance of non-financial considerations may relieve the
trustee of potential liability for dealing with shares in a family business in which the trustee also owns
shares. A settlor could also direct the trustee to consider social issues in investing.
77
Id. A beneficiary can consent to a self-dealing transaction by the trustee. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §
802(b)(4) (2005) (stating that a trustee‘s transaction with the trust property that is self-dealing is permitted
if the beneficiary consented to or ratified the transaction, or released the trustee in compliance with § 1009).
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extent the investment decision can be justified on grounds of advancing,
financially or operationally, a charitable activity conducted by the trust. 78
This comment may be the clearest legal articulation of the application of the duty of
loyalty to mission investing. The comment suggests that a trustee can consider the
charitable purpose of a trust as a factor in making investment decisions. Although the
Restatement and this comment apply to charities organized as trusts, trust law has long
served as a source of guidance for nonprofit corporations and seems a particularly
appropriate source in this context.79
C. Prudent Investor Standard
1. Prudent Investor Act—Rules for Charitable Trusts
¶26

Another fiduciary duty, the duty of prudent administration or the duty of care,
applies more directly to investment decision-making by trustees.80 In general, a trustee
must manage a trust as a prudent person would, exercising reasonable care, skill, and
caution. 81 The rules on investing trust assets lie within this duty of prudence. As early as
1830, the common law required a trustee to act with prudence when investing assets of a
trust.82 The prudence standard evolved over time, reflecting changes in the application of
the standard and changes in investing practices. 83 As modern portfolio theory became
more widely understood, the time came for a significant re-articulation of the standard.
¶27
The American Law Institute revised provisions in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
that applied to investment decision-making by trustees, creating, in 1992, the prudent
investor rule. 84 The Uniform Law Commission built on the Restatement project and in
1994 approved UPIA. This uniform Act provides rules on investing by trustees 85 and has
been widely adopted.86
78

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. c (2007).
See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, prefatory note (1994) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS:
PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 379, cmt. b (1992)) (―[T]he duties of the members of the governing board of a
charitable corporation are generally similar to the duties of the trustee of a charitable trust.‖).
80
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (2007) (―(1) The trustee has a duty to administer the trust as
a prudent person would, in light of the purposes, terms, and other circumstances of the trust. (2) The duty of
prudence requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution.‖).
81
See id. at § 77(2).
82
See Harvard Coll. v. Armory, 26 Mass. 446, 471–73 (1830).
83
John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV.
641, 643–46 (1996) (providing a history of prudent investing under trust law and the reasons for the
changes to trust law).
84
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007) (―The trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries to invest
and manage the funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.‖); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the
Third Restatement, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1151 (1992).
85
See Langbein, supra note 83, for a complete explanation of UPIA and a discussion of trust-investment
law.
86
Forty-four states have adopted UPIA. A Few Facts About the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, NAT‘L
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. L.,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upria.asp (last visited Nov. 20, 2010)
[hereinafter A Few Facts About UPIA]. Maryland is listed as ―substantially similar‖ and is counted in this
79
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UPIA‘s investment rules direct trustees to invest and manage trust assets as a
prudent investor would, exercising reasonable care, skill, and caution in doing so; 87 to
consider the entire portfolio in making investments and to allocate risk across the
portfolio;88 and to diversify trust assets unless the purposes of the trust are better served
by not diversifying. 89 UPIA encourages trustees to delegate some investment
responsibilities and provides a safe harbor for a trustee who exercises ―reasonable care,
skill, and caution‖ in selecting an agent, setting the terms of the delegation, and
monitoring the agent.90
¶29
The standard of care in UPIA directs a trustee to consider a number of factors,
some relating to economic conditions and some relating to the trust itself and the needs of
the beneficiaries. The trustee shall consider the ―purposes, terms, distribution
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.‖91 Thus, for a charitable trust, its
charitable purposes become factors to consider in making investment decisions. In
addition, the trustee shall consider, if relevant, ―an asset‘s special relationship or special
value, if any, to the purposes of the trust.‖92 The comment to UPIA § 2 explains that this
factor permits a trustee to take into account non-financial preferences of a beneficiary,
such as sentimental attachment to heirlooms or other prized assets. 93 For a charity, an
asset may be related to the charitable purpose. 94
¶28

2. UMIFA and UPMIFA—Rules for Nonprofit Corporations
¶30

In 1972, the Uniform Law Commission approved the Uniform Management of
Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA), an Act developed to provide legal guidance for
charities organized as nonprofit corporations. 95 At the time the Uniform Law
Commission developed the Act a great deal of uncertainty existed concerning the
fiduciary duties of directors of nonprofit corporations with respect to investment
decision-making. 96 UMIFA adopted rules that reflected changes in thinking about

Article as one of the forty-four states in the list. The District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands have
also adopted UPIA. Id. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust
Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J. L. & ECON. 681 (2007), for a discussion of the
effect of UPIA on investment decision-making.
87
UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (1994).
88
See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b).
89
Id. at § 3.
90
Id. at § 9. See Langbein, supra note 83, at 650–52 (describing the traditional nondelegation rule and the
importance for prudent investing of the changes wrought by UPIA); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 171 cmt. h (1959) (―A trustee cannot properly delegate to another power to select investments.‖).
91
UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a).
92
Id. at § 2(c)(8).
93
Id. at § 2 cmt.
94
A program-related asset is one related to the charitable purpose of the trust. See discussion supra Part
I.A.
95
Susan N. Gary, Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent Management of
Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1288 (2007).
96
See id. at 1284–87 (describing the report prepared by William Cary and Craig Bright that highlighted the
uncertainty because the law relating to charitable organizations was ―rudimentary and vague‖ and called for
statutory reform).
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investment decision-making: prudent decision-making that included diversification, a
total return concept, and delegation. Forty-eight jurisdictions adopted UMIFA.97
¶31
The prudence standards of UMIFA provided useful guidance to directors of
nonprofit corporations. Thirty-five years later, the development of UPIA provided a
catalyst for the decision to revise UMIFA. 98 In 2006, the Uniform Law Commission
approved a revised Act with a new name: the Uniform Prudent Management of
Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA). 99 UPMIFA still applies to nonprofit corporations and
not to trusts,100 but today the rules on investing are the same whether UPIA or UPMIFA
applies.
¶32
UPMIFA uses language from the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act to state
the overall duty of care for prudent investing. 101 Under UPMIFA, a charitable manager
must act ―in good faith and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances.‖102 The Act then uses language from UPIA
to provide more specific guidance for those managing and investing charitable funds. 103
UPMIFA directs the persons responsible for managing and investing the funds of an
institution to act as a prudent investor would, directly mirroring the language from UPIA.
UPMIFA includes the two factors noted above that direct the fiduciary to consider nonfinancial aspects of an investment. The Act directs the decision maker to consider ―the
charitable purposes of the institution and the purposes of the institutional fund‖ 104 in
managing and investing assets for the charity and adds that the fiduciary may consider, if
relevant, ―an asset‘s special relationship or special value, if any, to the charitable purposes
of the institution.‖105

97

A Few Facts About the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, NAT‘L CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. L., http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fsumifa.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
98
See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT prefatory note (2006). See Susan N. Gary,
Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act,
41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1280–88 (2007), for a detailed discussion of the history and adoption of UPMIFA.
99
Press Release, Nat‘l Conference of Commissioners on Unif. State Laws, Major Overhaul of Rules
Governing Charitable Institutions Approved, (July 13, 2006),
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemID=163.
100
UPMIFA, like UMIFA, applies to all charities, but the Acts do not apply to charitable funds managed in
trust form unless a charity is the trustee. The Acts do not cover charitable funds managed by corporate or
individual trustees. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (2006) at §1(2)(i); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT.
OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §2(5)(B).
101
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1988) states:
(a) A director shall discharge his or her duties as a director, including his or her duties
as a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise
under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
102
UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3(b).
103
Id. § 3 cmt. In 1992 the Prefatory Note to UPIA explained that the standards of UPIA ―can be expected
to inform the investment responsibilities of directors and officers of charitable corporations.‖ Id. Thus,
UPMIFA clarified the meaning of prudent investing for directors of charities. Id.
104
Id. at § 3(a).
105
Id. § 3(e)(1)(H).
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3. The Prudent Investor Rule and Mission Investing
¶33

Whether UPIA or UPMIFA applies, the prudent investor rule directs a charity to
consider its charitable purposes in making investment decisions. 106 Under the prudent
investor rule, consideration of the charitable purposes may affect the time horizon for
investments and the level of risk the charity should consider. A charity may consider its
purposes to select investments that may further those purposes. Although a charity
should not invest for vague social benefits unrelated to the charity‘s mission, an
examination of investment options can include consideration of ways in which the
investments can support the charity‘s mission.
¶34
In making any investment decisions, judgment is critical. The trustees or directors
must think through complex issues involving the charity‘s mission and the best way to
carry out that mission. The trustees or directors may delegate the actual selection of
investments to appropriate advisors, but the fiduciaries must set guidelines for investment
advisors.107 In developing an investment policy for an organization, the fiduciaries must
be careful to determine what strategies will best support their mission. A determination
of whether mission investing has a positive effect related to the charity‘s mission will
likely be difficult because many variables affect that determination, and because the cause
and effect of particular strategies may not be clear.108 The fiduciaries may determine that
a mission-related investment strategy ―feels good‖ but does not benefit the mission. 109 In
that case, the charity might conclude that it should spend its time and effort to maximize
profit and then use the profit for its mission. If the fiduciaries conclude that mission
investing will support the mission of the charity, they should establish a process that will
result in competent decision-making about investments.110
¶35
In addition to considering the charity‘s purpose, the investment decision maker
must consider a number of economic factors. A prudent investor will balance risk and
return, trying to maximize overall return within the charity‘s level of risk tolerance. If an
investment has a below-market return or carries a high level of risk, the investment may
not be prudent. An important consideration in connection with mission investing will be
the costs associated with investment options, not only in terms of each investment‘s fees
and expenses, but also the amount of time the charity must spend to choose and monitor
the investments. Mission investing requires additional research by someone, and the cost
of that research may result in additional fees for funds or time spent by investment
managers working directly for the charity.
¶36
The cost in the amount of staff time needed to engage in mission investing varies
depending on the type of strategy used. The efficacy of the strategies in carrying out a
106

UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT §§ 2(a), 2(c)(8) (1994); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL
FUNDS ACT §§ 3(a), 3(e)(1)(H).
107
UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT §9; UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 5.
108
See SIMON, POWERS & GUNNEMANN, supra note 3, at 100–108 (discussing the problems a university
may face).
109
Professor Dobris has written about the ―psychic income‖ a beneficiary may receive in the private trust
context, if the beneficiary supports socially responsible investing by the trustee. See Dobris, supra note 11,
at n. 27. Psychic income does not apply in the charitable context because the ―beneficiary‖ is the charitable
purpose and not an individual for whom the psychic income creates a benefit.
110
See SIMON, POWERS & GUNNEMANN, supra note 3, at 87. In developing a policy on socially responsible
investing for Yale, these authors made the establishment of a ―process which will yield reasonably skillful
and competent decisions‖ one of the investment principles. Id.
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charity‘s mission also varies. Issues of cost and usefulness will be discussed in the
following sections in connection with three types of socially responsible investment
strategies: screens, shareholder advocacy, and community investment. 111 The use of any
of these strategies by a charity will depend on the charity‘s purposes and its ability to
monitor the strategies.
i) Screens
¶37

Screens evaluate investments based on social or environmental criteria as well as
financial performance. Screens may be inclusionary or exclusionary. An inclusionary
screen helps identify companies in which to invest, while an exclusionary screen guides
managers to avoid certain companies. An inclusionary screen, for example, might guide a
manager to invest in companies that engage in sustainable environmental practices and do
not pollute, or companies that support employees through fair wages and benefits and
nondiscriminatory policies. An exclusionary screen might direct the manager not to
invest in companies that produce tobacco or alcohol, that pollute, or that practice
discriminatory employment practices. 112 Seventy-five percent of screened funds use
multiple screens, and a quarter of the funds screen on a single issue. 113
¶38
A determination of whether the use of screens in making investment decisions has
any effect on the companies that are included or excluded is difficult. Numerous
variables affect company behavior, and if one charity chooses to invest in a company or
to shun a company, the effect of that investment decision on the company may be
impossible to know. Determining the cost of a screen is easier, however, because the
screened fund can be compared with a conventional fund to determine whether choosing
the screened fund resulted in a lower return or in higher fees. Some SRI funds have
higher expenses and fees due to the additional research required, 114 but not all SRI funds
have higher costs. For example, Vanguard‘s FTSE Social Index reports fees of 0.25
percent.115 Some commentators have expressed concern that a screen will adversely
affect return,116 but even in the early days of socially responsible investing, other

111

In 2005, assets involved in socially responsible investing were identified as 68% in social screening
only, 26% in shareholder advocacy, 5% in screening and shareholder advocacy, and 1% in community
investing. TRENDS, supra note 24, at Figure 1.1.
112
See, e.g., Noyes Investment Policy, supra note 36 (listing both inclusionary and exclusionary screens).
113
TRENDS, supra note 24, at 8. Note that an investment manager might identify the same companies using
either an inclusionary or an exclusionary screen, but the emphasis of the two types of screens is somewhat
different. An inclusionary screen will identify companies that are particularly good at the sought-after
behavior. For example an environmental screen might look for companies with particularly strict pollution
controls. An exclusionary screen, in contrast, tells the investment manager that any company is acceptable
from the standpoint of the screen as long as the company does not engage in the bad behavior that is the
subject of the screen.
114
See Shauna Croome-Carther, Funds with Values, FORBES.COM, Nov. 14, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/investoreducation/2007/11/14/sri-funds-domini-pf-educationin_sc_1114investopedia_inl.html (noting that higher fees can be attributed to the costs of additional ethical
research and that SRI funds tend to be managed by smaller companies and do not have the benefits of
economies of scale).
115
Penelope Wang, For Do-Good Funds, an Ethical Dilemma, CNNMONEY.COM, March 22, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag_archive/2007/04/01/8403607/index.htm.
116
See Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 98–99.
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observers thought that positive screens could yield financial benefits. 117 More recently, a
number of studies have shown that socially responsible portfolios using screens have
returns comparable to those of conventional funds. 118 In fact, some advocates of SRI now
focus on the economic rather than the ethical benefits of SRI. 119
¶39
Data concerning the performance of SRI funds exist, but analysis of that data is
beyond the scope of this Article. As with many investment products, data may conflict
and performance claims may be difficult to establish. Further, good managers may
improve results, while poor managers may cause lower returns. Despite the limitations,
one study is worth mentioning because the results are both interesting and surprising.
¶40
An empirical study published in 2006 looked at the performance of companies
rather than funds to provide additional data on the benefits and costs of socially
responsible investing.120 The study found that companies with high scores on social
responsibility characteristics such as diversity and employee relations outperformed
companies with low ratings.121 Thus, positive screens resulted in financial benefits to the
investors. In contrast, companies typically screened out by socially responsible mutual
funds, in particular tobacco, alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, and nuclear companies,
outperformed stocks in other industries. 122 The study concluded that while other studies
had found that socially responsible mutual funds performed at about the same level as
conventional funds, those results occurred because the effects of the positive and negative
screens cancelled each other out for the socially responsible funds. 123 From the
standpoint of financial returns, the best result would be to invest in socially responsible
companies but not screen out ―sin‖ stocks and other companies typically shunned by SRI
funds. 124 Studies such as this one provide additional data for decision makers of charities.
117

SIMON, POWERS & GUNNEMANN, supra note 3, at 137–38.
Thompson, supra note 25; Statman & Glushkov, supra note 40, at 2–3 (citing four studies, from 1993,
1999, 2000, and 2005, that showed ―no statistically significant difference between the returns of socially
responsible mutual funds and those of conventional funds.‖); see also Solomon & Coe, supra note 32, at
233–50 (discussing the performance record of socially responsible funds). Jed Emerson also notes that
―[i]mpact investing is not your parent‘s socially responsible investment strategy.‖ Jed Emerson, Steady
Returns with Social Impact, FORBES, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/29/emerson-calvertsri-intelligent-investing-impact-investing.html (defining ―impact investing‖ as an investment strategy that
considers social and environmental factors, and challenging the idea that social investment is ―a belowmarket instrument where you need to assume you will have to take a hit on your financial returns to allow
for some vague effort to ‗do good,‘‖ by pointing to, among other investments, ―various microfinance
funds‖ which significantly outperformed many ―strictly commercial products‖ over the course of a year).
119
Richardson, supra note 1, at 246 (‖[A] ―new style of SRI‖ [based] ―on the assumption that SRI will
make investors prosperous rather than merely virtuous.‖). However, in a 2009 discussion on SRI for
private investors, Daniel Weiner, editor of Independent Adviser for Vanguard Investors, felt compelled to
say, ―there is absolutely zero evidence that investors will see better performance using an SRI strategy.‖
Michael Maiello, Mutual Funds: Is SRI Worth the Hassle?, FORBES, Aug. 21, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/20/sri-mutual-funds-intelligent-investing-ethics.html.
The shift from
concern over taking reduced returns in order to engage in SRI to the idea that SRI might result in better
returns is striking. See id.
120
Statman & Glushkov, supra note 40, at 3.
121
Id. at 4.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
See David K. Randall, Sin Stocks Outperform Over Time, Study Says, FORBES.COM, Oct. 21, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/21/sin-stocks-outperform-personal-finance-sin-stocks.html (describing a
study that showed that tobacco, alcohol and gambling stocks outperformed other companies by 2.5%
118
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Even if an investment that furthers a charity‘s mission produces a financial result
that falls below what the charity might have expected from another investment, the
decision to invest for mission may still be prudent. A prudent investor considers the
purposes of the charity in making investment decisions, and if an investment furthers
those purposes, then a lower financial return may be acceptable. A prudent investor
should not invest solely for mission without regard for financial returns, but mission can
be a factor to consider, along with the other factors related to economic conditions and
performance. It may be appropriate for the charity to consider part of the investment to
be an expenditure, since the lost revenue is not available for use for the charity‘s
purposes.125
¶42
The Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation (the Noyes Foundation) provides an example
of a charity that ―views its investments as an integrated component of its overall
mission.‖126 The Noyes Foundation has adopted an investment policy that stresses a
combination of mission investing and generating returns to support its charitable
mission.127 Its spending and investment goals include producing income and capital gains
to support operations and grant-making; providing capital directly to enterprises that
further the mission; maintaining ―the real (inflation adjusted) value of its assets over the
long term;‖ owning equity or debt in companies that further its mission; and avoiding
investments in ―companies whose environmental or social impacts contribute to the issues
that the Foundation‘s grant-making seeks to address.‖128 This investment policy provides
detailed guidelines for the investment managers, including benchmarks tied to
performance standards. 129 The Noyes Foundation has established market index
benchmarks for each asset class and expects managers to meet or exceed these
benchmarks.130 Thus, the investment policy makes clear the Noyes Foundation‘s
expectation that its investments will not produce lower returns even though the
investment choices also support its mission.
¶43
In terms of how investments support its mission, the Noyes Foundation‘s
investment policy identifies inclusionary and exclusionary screens related to four aspects
of the Foundation‘s mission.131 The policy notes that to ―avail itself of a full spectrum of
investment diversification,‖ the Foundation may invest in asset classes for which
¶41

annually from 1926–2006, and suggested that because many investors, including universities and pension
funds, shun these stocks, the demand and therefore the price is lower than it would otherwise be).
125
A mission investment may be prudent even if the return for that investment is less than the charity might
have otherwise received. In a troubling statement on its website, Social Investment Forum considers the
increasing amount of investment in SRI by ―major U.S. fiduciaries‖ evidence that ―SRI strategies do not
impede financial returns‖ because ―fiduciaries are obligated by law to seek competitive returns for the
portfolios they manage.‖ See Performance and Socially Responsible Investments, SOCIAL INVESTMENT
FORUM, http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/performance.cfm.
126
Noyes Investment Policy, supra note 36.
127
See id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. Indices include the Domini 400 Social Index, S&P 500 Index, Russell 2000 Value Index, and
Lehman Bros. Aggregate Bond Index. Id.
131
Id. (listing four broad categories for screens: toxic emissions, extractive industries, and environmental
justice; sustainable agricultural and food systems; reproductive health and rights; a sustainable and socially
just society). The Noyes Foundation also employs proxy voting. Id.
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screening is unavailable.132 For example, hedge funds, venture capital, and real estate
may be an appropriate part of a diversified portfolio, but screening may not be feasible. 133
The Noyes Foundation reviews manager performance on a quarterly basis, and that
review includes comparison of the Foundation‘s screened portfolio with other screened
and unscreened portfolios, including the benchmarks for each asset class; adherence to
the screens and values of the Foundation; interactions with companies in the portfolio
through shareholder activities or otherwise; transaction costs; and portfolio balancing
among the managers.134 At least once every three years, the Noyes Foundation also
reviews the relationship between its financial returns and the impact of screening. 135 The
Foundation‘s website does not disclose the findings in those reviews, but the fact that the
Noyes Foundation continues to use the screens as part of its investment strategy suggests
satisfaction with the returns obtained.
¶44
The Noyes Foundation appears to be operating as a prudent investor with respect to
its funds, managing them for both return and mission. The website does not provide
information on actual investment performance, but if the Noyes Foundation follows the
rigorous review process outlined in the investment policy, underperforming funds or
managers are likely to be quickly replaced.
ii) Shareholder Advocacy—Proxy Voting
¶45

Some charities use their position as shareholders to try to influence corporate
behavior.136 Shareholder resolutions on social, environmental, and corporate governance
issues have increased over the past few years. 137 A group of shareholders may use a
shareholder resolution to try to change a company‘s behavior, even though the financial
returns to shareholders have been acceptable. Even if a particular resolution fails to pass,
the resolution puts the managers and directors on notice about the priorities and concerns
of at least some of the company‘s shareholders. Shareholders may also engage in
ongoing dialogue with management, sometimes as a lead-up to filing a shareholder
resolution and sometimes as an alternative to filing shareholder resolutions. 138
¶46
The Noyes Foundation‘s investment policy promotes shareholder advocacy as part
of its mission investing and provides directions on how the Foundation should use its
―voice.‖139 The investment policy states that if a proxy involves program interests, the
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Id.
Id.
134
Id. The investment policy contains detailed rules for putting a fund on ―watch‖ status and terminating a
fund if the Finance Committee loses confidence in the fund‘s management. Id.
135
Id.
136
A fiduciary holding shares as assets for a charity has a fiduciary duty to vote the shares. UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 802(g) (2005); UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (1994); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3(b) (2006). Any resolution can have an impact on the company, and
increasingly resolutions that address social and environmental issues appear on the ballot for proxy voting.
All investors in the company will be confronted with the resolution, so a charity that can help get a
resolution on the ballot may gain support for its issue more broadly. TRENDS, supra note 24, at 16–27.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 18–19 (describing dialogue as a shareholder tool and also describing dialogue between fund
managers and management as a means to promote corporate social responsibility).
139
Noyes Investment Policy, supra note 36.
133
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Foundation will vote in a manner consistent with those interests.140 When a shareholder
issue involves social or environmental matters not directly related to program interests,
the Foundation ―will review each individual case and consult with [its] grantees,
managers and others, as appropriate.‖141 The investment policy provides guidelines for
voting on issues of corporate governance. 142 In some cases, the Foundation may hold
shares in a company that is incompatible with the Foundation‘s mission and use its
position as a shareholder to address its concerns. 143
¶47
Socially responsible funds may use the weight of many investors, both charities and
private investors, to influence corporate behavior. In 2002, the socially responsible
investing fund Domini144 led a coalition of investors holding 500,000 shares of stock in
Procter & Gamble. 145 The shareholders urged Procter & Gamble to offer Fair Trade
Certified coffee146 and eventually filed a related shareholder resolution. 147 In 2003,
Procter & Gamble announced that it would begin marketing Fair Trade Certified coffee
products.148 Other factors, including pressure from consumers and humanitarian
organizations, influenced Procter & Gamble, but the shareholder action played a role in
the company‘s decision. 149
¶48
Shareholder advocacy requires more active involvement by charities owning stock
in the companies than does investing with screens, but a charity with the resources to
devote to shareholder advocacy may find it an effective way to support the organization‘s
mission,150 and the connection between mission and investment may be more significant.
Given the increased cost in time, when deciding whether to engage in shareholder
advocacy, the charity must consider whether the time could be better spent on other
mission-related activities. 151 Clearly, a decision to engage in this sort of mission
investing requires a careful exercise of judgment by the charity‘s decision makers.
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Id.
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Domini Social Investments integrates social and environmental criteria into investment decisions for the
funds it manages. Welcome to Domini Social Investments, DOMINI SOC. INVESTMENTS,
http://www.domini.com/about-domini/index.htm. Domini develops and applies social and environmental
standards for the funds and Wellington Management is responsible for financial standards and portfolio
construction for the funds. Id. In 2008 Domini filed 19 shareholder resolutions. William Donovan, Full
Contact Investing, ABOUT.COM: SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING,
http://socialinvesting.about.com/od/srishareholders/a/socialactivism.htm.
145
Press Release, Global Exchange, Advocacy Groups and Shareholders Persuade Procter and Gamble,
GLOBAL E XCH. (Sept. 15, 2003), http://www.globalexchange.org/update/press/1043.html. Domini worked
with the Center for Reflection, Education and Action (CREA), a research, education, and action
organization. Id.
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Fair Trade certification requires a minimum level of compensation for small coffee farmers, a level
designed to allow the farmers to support their families. Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See Dobris, supra note 11, at 777 (suggesting that proxy voting and shareholder motions may be more
effective than screens in changing corporate behavior).
151
See, e.g., SIMON, POWERS & GUNNEMANN, supra note 3, at 86 (detailing the various considerations that
a university must take into account).
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iii) Community Investing
¶49

Community investing typically uses capital from investors and lends it to people or
businesses in underserved communities. 152 Through community investing, funds can be
made available to low-income individuals, small businesses, and organizations providing
services such as affordable housing. A charity may engage directly in community
investing or may invest through a local organization that provides the financial services.
¶50
Many micro-finance organizations operate internationally. For example, the
Grameen Foundation provides capital to micro-lenders in poor communities around the
world so that they can make small loans to individuals, mostly women, to start
businesses. 153 The Foundation uses several strategies to make repayments likely, and, as
loans are repaid, uses the funds to make new loans. 154 Other financial services
organizations operate in the United States. Community development banks and
community development credit unions lend money in underserved communities to
individuals who might not have access to conventional financial services. 155 For
example, Bethex Federal Credit Union provides financial services to low income families
in the Bronx.156 Organized in 1970 to help ―welfare mothers‖ who solved their cash
emergencies by using a pawnshop or loan shark, the credit union now has assets of $16
million. 157 Members‘ accounts provide some of the funds available for lending, and lowinterest or no-interest deposits from banks and foundations enlarge the lending pool.158
After Hurricane Katrina devastated parts of New Orleans, the Hope Community Credit
Union helped local residents obtain loans for businesses and home repairs. 159 These
community credit unions provide financial services to low income people who might not
otherwise be able to obtain loans and other services. 160
¶51
Trinity College, in Hartford, Connecticut, provides a good example of direct
community investing. By the 1990s, the area around Trinity College had become
depressed and unsafe.161 The College bought properties adjacent to its own property,
fixed up the properties, and then sold them to homeowners and businesses.162 Trinity did
not intend to use the properties directly for college purposes, but did anticipate that
revitalizing the area near the campus would result in benefits for the college community
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TRENDS, supra note 24, at 28–29.
What We Do, GRAMEEN FOUND., http://www.grameenfoundation.org/what_we_do.
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See id; see Microfinance Basics, GRAMEEN FOUNDATION, http://www.grameenfoundation.org/what-wedo/microfinance/microfinance-basics.
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TRENDS, supra note 24, at 29–30.
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About Us, BETHEX FED. CREDIT UNION, http://bethexfcu.org/about.htm.
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Id.
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Id.
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See Tracy Fernandez Rysavy & Prianjali Mascarenhas, Financing Hope, YES!,
http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/go-local/financing-hope.
160
About Us, NAT‘L FED‘N OF COMMUNITY DEV. CREDIT UNIONS,
http://www.cdcu.coop/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=256#About_our_members.
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See Eric Goldscheider, College Initiates Program to Give Back to Its Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2000, at B15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/01/nyregion/college-initiates-program-to-giveback-to-its-neighbors.html.
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See Jane Gross, Trinity College Leads Effort to Spark Hartford’s Renewal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997,
at A1, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E07EFDF163FF937A25757C0A961958260.
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and would likely increase student applications. 163 Viewed entirely from an investment
perspective, the acquisitions would likely not have been prudent. 164 In contrast, as assets
that provided both a degree of investment potential and benefits for the purposes of the
college, the purchases made sense.165
¶52
The impact of community investing continues to grow. For many of the charities
that engage in this type of investing, the investing may be such a significant part of the
charity‘s mission that the investments may properly be considered program-related assets.
The rules of prudence apply, but the concerns about financial return will differ from the
analysis applied to other types of mission investing.
III. JEOPARDIZING INVESTMENTS—IRC § 4944
¶53

The Internal Revenue Code provides one other legal rule that applies to investment
decision-making by charities, although it applies only to private foundations. 166 Section
4944 prohibits private foundations from investing in investments that jeopardize a private
foundation‘s charitable purposes.167 Congress enacted § 4944 as part of a group of code
sections, termed the private foundation rules, added to the Internal Revenue Code in
1969.168 Prior to 1969, Congress became concerned that foundations created and
managed by an individual or a family were at risk of possible abuse by those individuals
or family members. 169 The private foundation rules represented an attempt to curtail
these abuses, with a particular focus on self-dealing and business holdings in donorowned companies. 170 The rule regarding jeopardizing investments has been described as
―[a] minor proposal to control trading and speculation, which the Treasury found only
among a small group of foundations.‖171
¶54
Section 4944 exempts from its coverage investments that qualify as programrelated investments.172 If a foundation makes an investment to accomplish a charitable
purpose of the foundation, and if the production of income is not a ―significant purpose,‖
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Gitta Morris, How Trinity Aims to Stay Competitive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1996, at CN1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/18/nyregion/how-trinity-aims-to-stay-competitive.html;
see
Stacey
Stowe, Raising the Neighborhood: A Few Years Into Its Ambitious Plan, Trinity College Sees Results, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, at CT1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/29/nyregion/raisingneighborhood-few-years-into-its-ambitious-plan-trinity-college-sees.html (indicating applications to Trinity
have increased seventy-seven percent).
164
Goldscheider, supra note 161.
165
Id. The investments Trinity College made could be viewed as program-related investments. Whether
considered program-related investments or mission investments, the investments served a purpose related
to the mission of the college and were carried out in a prudent manner.
166
The IRC creates two categories of charities: public charities (those that meet the requirements of § 509)
and private foundations (all other charities). I.R.C. § 509 (2006). In general (and superficially) private
foundations typically have one or very few donors and do not receive support from the general public. Id.
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§ 4944(a)(2).
168
See Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundation Law: Historical Perspective on Its Origins and
Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 52 (2000).
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Congressman Wright Patman led a campaign against foundation abuse. WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN, THE
BIG FOUNDATIONS 7 (1972); see also Troyer, supra note 168 at 63.
170
Troyer, supra note 168, at 57.
171
Id. at 58.
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I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2006); see supra Section I.A.
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the asset will not be subject to § 4944.173 Thus, § 4944 applies to mission investing
because, by definition, a charity uses mission investing to generate investment returns as
well as to carry out charitable purposes. Section 4944 meshes with the prudent investor
rules already discussed.174 An investment decision maker must weigh economic factors
when engaging in mission investing and if the decision maker does so and then makes
prudent investment decisions, § 4944 should not impose a penalty on the charity or the
manager.
IV. DONORS
Although not directly related to the fiduciary‘s duties with respect to a charity,
donors may play a role in connection with a charity‘s investments. Donors can, in a gift
agreement entered into with a charity, provide directions about how a charity should
invest the donated funds. 175 For example, a donor concerned with risk could direct a
charity to invest only in financial instruments backed by the U.S. government. The
charity could decide whether to accept such a restriction and might decline the gift on
those terms. A donor might also direct the charity to engage in a particular form of
mission investing. For example, a donor could require that a charity dedicated to
improving health not invest in tobacco stocks.176 Again, the charity would decide
whether to accept the gift with the restriction. Finally, a donor might increase the
fiduciary‘s discretion with respect to investment decision-making, perhaps in order to
make relationship to mission a more important factor to consider.
¶56
Donors will probably not object to a charity‘s decision to engage in mission
investing, as long as the decision makers continue to act as prudent investors. Some
donors may even assume that a charity will make investment decisions that further the
charity‘s mission, or at least do not undercut the mission. For example, a donor to a
charity organized to promote sustainable forestry might be distressed to learn that the
charity invested in a traditionally run timber company, unless the charity planned to use
shareholder advocacy to change logging practices. If donors expect mission investing,
then donor expectations may push charities to engage in more mission investing.
Charities may be able to use mission investing to attract new donors, but a charity must
¶55
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§ 4944(c) (defining program-related investment).
The regulations under § 4944 make clear that a foundation manager can avoid making jeopardizing
investments by acting as a prudent investor. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2). The regulations describe the
type of prudence a prudent investor would exercise, without using the term ―prudent investor.‖
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Susan N. Gary, The Problems with Donor Intent: Interpretation, Enforcement, and Doing the Right
Thing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 995 (2010).
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Jeffrey Cooper has suggested that, under the Uniform Trust Code, a settlor of a trust could not place a
negative restriction on a trustee‘s ability to invest in companies the settlor found repugnant, for example
cigarette manufacturers. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, The Uniform Trust Code,
and the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1193–94 (2008). Although the UTC
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be careful not to antagonize donors by investing imprudently, either by engaging in
socially responsible investing that is not related to the charity‘s mission or by incurring
costs that are not outweighed by mission-related benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
¶57

Little case law exists that addresses investment decision-making by managers of
charities. 177 Thus, the statutes on prudent investing and the Restatements of Trusts
remain the best sources of legal guidance. Neither UPIA nor UPMIFA discusses mission
investing directly, but an analysis of those statutes suggests that the law permits mission
investing by charities. Descriptions of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence in the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts support this view, and a comment to the general standard of
prudent investment agrees with this interpretation of the law. 178
¶58
Trustees and directors of charities should understand the legal rules that apply to
investment decision-making by a fiduciary. Private investors can choose to engage in
socially responsible investing with their own funds, but a fiduciary must act in the best
interests or sole interests of the charity, without letting personal interests dictate decisionmaking. A fiduciary must exercise judgment carefully, and issues involved in mission
investing can be complex. As long as a fiduciary acts as a prudent investor, however, the
fiduciary may consider the charity‘s mission among the other factors that apply to prudent
investing. The fiduciary should consider the efficacy of an investment in relation to the
charity‘s mission and also the costs incurred in connection with the investment, while
keeping in mind that investments may support the charitable mission in non-financial as
well as financial ways. A fiduciary acting on behalf of a charity has significant discretion
in making investment decisions. So long as the fiduciary exercises judgment with due
regard to the factors a prudent investor should consider, the fiduciary will be in
compliance with the applicable legal duties. The fiduciary can choose to include mission
investing as part of the charity‘s investment strategy.
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See Dobris, supra note 11, at 773–774 (noting that very little litigation about SRI exists and suggesting
that a case with a sympathetic trustee could provide ―more flexibility in regard to SRI‖).
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See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. c (2007).
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